





We introduce capacity constrained competition between market-making
intermediaries in a model in which agents can choose between trading with
intermediaries, joining a search market or remaining inactive. Recently,
market-making by a monopolistic intermediary has been analyzed by Rust
and Hall (2003) and Gehrig (1993). Market-makers set publicly observable
ask and bid prices. Because market-making involves price setting, without
further restrictions competition between market-making intermediaries is
Bertrand-like and yields the Walrasian outcome, where the ask-bid spread
is zero (Rust and Hall 2003, Gehrig 1993). However, positive ask-bid
spreads and competition between market-makers can be observed in re-
ality, e.g. in banking and in retailing. Following Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) and Boccard and Wauthy (2000), we therefore introduce physical
capacity constraints. This allows for a gradual transition from monopolis-
tic to perfectly competitive intermediation as the number of intermediaries
increases. In particular, we show that given Cournot capacities, interme-
diaries will set Cournot bid and ask prices in the subsequent subgames,
so that the equilibrium of the intermediated market coincides with the
Walrasian equilibrium as the number of intermediaries becomes large.
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In this paper, we analyze competition between market-making intermediaries.
These intermediaries set bid prices on the input market and ask prices on the
output market of intermediation. Our starting point is the model developed by
Gehrig (1993). According to this model, individual agents who are buyers or
sellers can join a search market, join the monopolistic intermediary or remain
inactive. In the search market, agents are randomly matched and the price at
which exchange takes place is set bilaterally. Because matching is random, the
search market does not exhaust all possible gains from trade. If agents join the
intermediary, buyers have to pay an ask price set in advance by the intermediary.
Likewise, if they decide to deal through the intermediary, sellers are paid the
bid price the monopolistic intermediary previously announced. The intermediary
trades simultaneously with both buyers and sellers. Gehrig shows that there is
an equilibrium in which the search market and the market of the monopolistic
intermediary are simultaneously open and where the intermediary makes positive
profits because he trades at a positive ask-bid spread. More precisely, the set of
individual agents is tripartite: High valuation buyers and low cost sellers deal
through the intermediary. Buyers and sellers with average valuations and costs
are active in the search market, and low valuation buyers and high cost sellers
remain inactive. This model can also be seen as an instance of competing ex-
changes. Full efficiency (i.e. the Walrasian or Marshallian market equilibrium)
of the more efficient exchange is not established due to limited (i.e. absence of)
competition among intermediaries. Two obvious applications are the labor and
the housing market, where typically intermediated and search markets co-exist.1
But we may also think of banks and retailers as providing, among other things,
the kinds of services intermediaries achieve in this type of model.
We extend the basic Gehrig model in two ways. (1) We impose a sequential
structure by requiring that intermediaries first have to buy the good from the
sellers (this is called the input market of intermediation) before it can be sold to
buyers on what we call the output market of intermediation. (2) We introduce ca-
pacity constraints and competition between capacity constrained intermediaries.
The most important consequence of (1) is that there is a unique subgame
1Another application: Foreign exchange market and POW-camp (Radford, 1945).
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perfect equilibrium with an active search market, in which the equilibrium ana-
lyzed by Gehrig is replicated on the equilibrium path (see Loertscher, 2003). The
rationale behind (2) is the following. As is well known, competition among price
setting firms is apt to lead to paradoxical results such as the one uncovered by
Bertrand, according to which ”two is enough for perfect competition.” The same
is true in our model. However, the problem arises not on the output market but
on the input market of intermediation, where without additional restrictions bid
price competition is (like in Stahl, 1988) a winner-takes-all competition for the
monopoly profit accruing on the output market. The most important contribu-
tion to solve the Bertrand paradox has been made by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983, KS hereafter) who analyze a two stage game. In the first stage, two firms
set capacities and in the second stage, they compete as price setters on a product
market. For our purpose, it is therefore quite natural to follow this approach.
The regions of pure strategy equilibria in the bid price setting subgame are the
same as in KS and Boccard and Wauthy (2000, BW hereafter) (who extend the
KS setting to n firms). If no firm’s capacity is strictly larger than its Cournot
best response function, given the capacities of all other firms, then there is a pure
strategy equilibrium in which all firms set the input market clearing bid price.
Therefore, the problem studied by KS and our problem are very similar in that
respect.
[to be completed]
Apart from the model developed by Gehrig (1993), our paper is also related
to Spulber (1996), Spulber (1999), and to Rust and Hall (2003). The main
similarities and differences are best highlighted by briefly commenting on the
following quote, taken from Spulber (1996, p.579):
Intermediation between customers and suppliers often is the primary
economic activity of firms, whether they are merchants or manu-
facturers. The neoclassical model of the firm implicitly recognizes
that as intermediaries, firms coordinate input purchases, production,
distribution, and output sales. However, since the neoclassical firm
takes prices as given, the firm only intermediates on the quantity side
by transforming inputs into outputs. In the neoclassical framework,
market-making takes place outside the firm though exogenous price
adjustment represented by the Walrasian auctioneer. On the other
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hand, models of imperfect competition in the field of industrial orga-
nization have brought the price setting role of firms to center stage,
but ignore the intermediation role of firms by emphasizing competi-
tion in product markets.
We focus on the same problem as Spulber, but in a sense we want to go two
steps further by (i) introducing (imperfect) competition between a finite number
of market-making intermediaries and (ii) allowing prices to exert more power as
they are public rather than private signals.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In section
3, we analyze the equilibrium of the output and the input market, and section 4
contains (preliminary) conclusions. Problems concerning the mixed strategy equi-
librium on the input market and some further considerations concerning Cournot
competition are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of buyers willing to buy one unit of an indivisible good of
homogenous quality, which is known to every one. Their preferences are described
by reservation prices r which are uniformly distributed over the unit interval,
r ∼ U [0, 1]. If a buyer with reservation price r buys the product at price p
(where the volunteer nature of exchange and individual rationality require p ≤ r),
his utility gain is r − p. This generates an aggregate demand schedule D(p) =
1 − p, p ∈ [0, 1], which can be interpreted as a (Walrasian) market demand.
Analogously, sellers’ preferences are described by reservation prices or unit costs
of production s which are uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. If
a seller with reservation price s sells the product at price p (where volunteer
exchange under individual rationality requires p ≥ s), his utility gain is p− s, so
that the aggregate (Walrasian) supply function is S(p) = p, p ∈ [0, 1]. A buyer
with reservation price r owns another good that he can exchange for the good
in question. This good is called money. We assume that buyers have and sellers
accept money in exchange for the good.
Walrasian (or Marshallian) Outcome Given the demand function D(p) =
1−p and the supply function S(p) = p, the Walrasian market outcome is charac-
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terized by price pW = 1
2
and quantity exchanged QW = 1
2
, and buyers with r ≥ 1
2
and sellers with s ≤ 1
2
participate in the market, while the other agents remain
inactive.
However, at the core of our model is the assumption that there is no benevolent
auctioneer quoting market clearing prices and coordinating trading activities at
zero costs. The purpose of our analysis is to study what allocation emerges if
agents establish this allocation themselves.
Buyers and sellers can either meet in a decentralized search market where
they are randomly matched and where they share the gains from trade evenly.
(Alternative bargaining procedures and their consequences are discussed in de-
tail by Loertscher (2003).) Or they can join intermediaries or remain inactive.
Intermediaries first set a physical capacity constraint. Then they set a bid price
at which they are willing to buy from the sellers, and finally they set an ask
price at which they are willing to sell what they have previously bought. In the
presence of intermediation, buyers and sellers face thus three decisions. They can
either join the intermediary, enter the search market or choose to remain inactive.
We denote by Iσ (Iβ) the set of all sellers (buyers) who join the intermediation
market. The set of sellers (buyers) active in the search market is denoted by Sσ
(Sβ), and the set of sellers (buyers) who decide not to be active is denoted by
Zσ (Zβ). Finally, we denote by Ωσ (Ωβ) the set of all sellers (buyers), so that by
definition Zσ ≡ Ωσ\(Iσ ∪ Sσ) and Zβ ≡ Ωβ\(Iβ ∪ Sβ). The (Lebesgue) measure
of these sets is denoted by υ(.), e.g. υ(Iσ) is the measure of sellers joining the
intermediated market.
2.1 The Dynamic Intermediation Game
We now describe the dynamic intermediation game with capacity constrained
intermediaries. We speak interchangeably of intermediaries and firms. There
are n profit maximizing intermediaries, indexed by i = 1, .., n. Each of them is
endowed with a physical capacity constraint qi.
2 These capacity constraints are
such that intermediary i can trade any quantity q ≤ qi at zero marginal costs,
whereas trading any quantity greater than qi is prohibitively costly. An example
2It would be very desirable if the choice of capacity could be endogenized as e.g. in Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983). However, the mixed strategy equilibrium has turned out to be too
complicated to allow for this. See Appendix A.
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for a physical capacity constraint is the number of counters of an intermediary
or his storage capacity for the input purchased.
The capacities of all firms are observed by all other firms and all individual
agents. Given these observations, intermediaries then set simultaneously bid
prices bi, which can subsequently not be changed. The legal arrangement is
such that each intermediary is obliged to buy any quantity up to the capacity
constraint qi sellers are willing to sell to him at bid price bi. Having observed qi
and bi for all i, sellers decide whether or not to join the intermediated market.
The market where sellers interact with intermediaries is called the input market
(of intermediation). All bid prices are public information. If more than qi sellers
want to sell to intermediary i the qi sellers with the lowest cost can sell to i.
In other words, we assume that an efficient rationing rule applies. Those sellers
who get rationed by intermediary i can then join any other intermediary where
again an efficient rationing rule applies. However, joining the intermediation
market is an irreversible decision so that sellers who have decided to try to sell
to any intermediary but who were rationed cannot subsequently go back to the
search market. We assume that agents who cannot expect positive utility gain
from joining the intermediated market will not join it. In exchange for the good
sellers get money from the intermediary to whom they sell. We assume that all
intermediaries have enough money and that sellers are aware of this.3 When all
intermediaries have finished buying, the quantity bought qbi by each intermediary
i is observed by all agents. From what has just been said we know that qbi ≤ qi.
The sets of sellers joining the intermediary is denoted as Iσ and its (Lebesgue)
measure is denoted as υ(Iσ). For reasons of tractability, we assume also that the
set of sellers joining the intermediated market is observed by all agents remaining
in the game.
In the second stage, each intermediary i sets the publicly observable ask price
ai and buyers decide whether to join the intermediated market. As with sellers,
buyers who have joined the intermediated market cannot go back to the search
market in case they are rationed. In case rationing occurs, an efficient rationing
3The quantity of money an intermediary holds can be regarded as his short-term capital,
while his long-term or fixed capital is embedded in his physical capacity constraint qi. In a
richer model, one could endogenize the money or short-term capital an intermediary holds.
Thus, short-term capital would be a strategic variable in addition to the capacity constraint
and might be used a signalling device to attract customers. Section ?? provides a motivation
why such an extension might be enriching.
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rule applies. The market where buyers interact with intermediaries is called the
output market (of intermediation). The legal arrangement is such that at the ask
price ai intermediary i is obliged to sell any quantity q ≤ qbi buyers are willing to
buy from him. If an intermediary cannot sell its whole stock qbi he can dispose of
the excess quantity for free. However, as on the input market intermediaries are
committed to the prices they set. We assume that the set Iβ is observable. Like
sellers, intermediaries accept money in exchange for the good they sell.
In the third and last stage, sellers and buyers who have not joined the inter-
mediated market decide simultaneously whether to join the search market. We
assume that agents join the search market only if their expected utility from
doing so is positive. This prevents the search market from being overcrowded
with agents who never engage in trade. The set of sellers (buyers) joining the
search market is denoted by Sσ(Sβ), and their (Lebesgue) measure is denoted by
υ(Sσ) (υ(Sβ)). The matching technology is such that if the number of buyers and
sellers is the same, each buyer (seller) is matched with probability λ to a seller
(buyer), where λ ∈ [0, 1]. If the number (or measure) of, say, sellers active in the
search market is larger than that of buyers, the probability of being matched to
a buyer is correspondingly adjusted downwards, while the probability of a match
for buyers is still λ. That is, the traders on the long side of the search market
are matched with probability γiλ, where γi =
υ(Ij)
υ(Ii)
< 1 with i = σ, β, j 6= i.
There is no further possibility to trade after a match has been established. For
those who are not matched, the game is over. As observed by Spulber (1999, p.
561), the search market is static in the sense that search market participants are
randomly and pairwise matched at most once. If a buyer with reservation price
r and a seller with cost s are matched they share the gain from trade evenly if
r − s > 0. That is, they agree on the price p = r−s
2
. After that, the game is
over. If r − s ≤ 0, the game is over for these agents without trade taking place.
Finally, the sets of inactive sellers (buyers) is denoted as Zσ(Zβ).
Let us summarize the time structure of the dynamic intermediation game.
This structure departs from the one in previous versions of the model (Gehrig,
1993; Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Spulber, 1999), where the game is played in
simultaneous moves, but it is the same as in Loertscher (2003). The dynamic
intermediation game has three stages.
1. Input Market: There are n intermediaries indexed by i = 1, ..n. They are
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endowed with capacity constraints qi. Before setting bid prices bi on the
input market, qi is observed by all i and by all sellers and buyers. Up to
qi, intermediary i is obliged to buy any quantity sellers want to sell to him
at bid price bi. After observing bi (and qi) sellers decide simultaneously
whether to join the intermediated market. For all those sellers who join
the intermediated market, the game is over, regardless of whether they
can actually sell or not. The quantity bought by each intermediary, qbi is
public information, and the set of sellers joining the intermediary is public
information, too.
2. Output Market: On the output market, intermediary i sets an ask price
ai at which he has to sell any quantity buyers want to buy up to his whole
stock qbi . In case there is rationing, an efficient rationing rule applies. For
buyers who decide to join the intermediary the game is over, regardless of
whether they can buy or get rationed. The set of buyers who have joined
the intermediary, Iβ is observed by all players remaining in the game.
3. Search Market: Sellers and buyers who have not joined the intermediary
may join the search market. Those who participate in the search market
are randomly matched. The matching technology is such that all traders
in the search market are matched with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] if the set of
sellers and buyers active in the search market have the same measure. A
buyer r and a seller s who are successfully matched share the gains from
trade evenly by agreeing on the price r−s
2
if r− s > 0. If r− s ≤ 0, they do
not exchange the good. After that, the game is over.
2.2 Strategies
There are three types of agents, sellers s, buyers r and intermediaries i = 1, .., n.
Let q denote the n-tuple of capacities (q1, ..., qn), let q
b be the n-tuple of quanti-
ties bought (qb1, ..., q
b
n), and let b = (b1, ..., bn) and a = (a1, ..., an) be the n-tuples
of bid and ask prices, respectively. Finally, as with quantities and capacities, we
use the subscripts i and −i to indicate the variable chosen by i and all firms other
than i, respectively. For example, bi is intermediary i’s bid price and b−i are the
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bid prices of all firms.4 Given these conventions, a strategy for a seller s is
τs = (Is(b,q); Ss(a,b,q, Iσ, Iβ)) . (1)
Similarly, for a buyer a strategy is
ρr = (Ir(a,b,q, Iσ, ), Sr(a,b,q, Iσ, Iβ)) (2)
where the functions Ik(.) and Sk(.) specify the conditions under which agent k
joins the intermediary or the search market, respectively, k = s, r. Note that
both for sellers and buyers, we do not have to specify the decision to be inactive,
because it is contained in the case where an agent decides to join neither the








where the qi’s are a real positive numbers and bi(q) and ai(q
b, Iσ) are real val-
ued functions. In general, strategies for this game are cumbersome expressions
because there are so many states of the world for which each agent must have a
complete contingent plan. For example, every small change in the set of sellers
deciding to join the intermediary will require a different optimal response by all
other players in subsequent periods. Since there is an infinity of such contingen-
cies, it would not be possible to write down these strategies in closed forms in
general. However, as we show next, the space over which these strategies have to
defined can be reduced considerably.
2.2.1 Partitioning of Buyers and Sellers
As it turns out, in any equilibrium with an active search market, the set of
individual agents is tripartite: High valuation buyers and low cost sellers deal
through an intermediary. Buyers and sellers with average valuations and costs
are active in the search market, and low valuation buyers and high cost sellers
remain inactive.5 This result is due to Gehrig (1993) and stated formally in
the following Proposition. It is important because it allows us to consider only
strategies that are defined for such tripartite sets.
4Note that in contrast to the case of quantities or capacities, where q−i ≡
∑n
j 6=i qj , b−i is
not a sum but a (n− 1)-tuple.
5Spulber (1996) and Rust and Hall (2003) report the same result in similar contexts.
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Proposition 1 (Gehrig (1993), Proposition 1) In any equilibrium with an
active search market,6 there are critical reservation values r and r, such that the
set of buyers can be partitioned into three subsets . If r ∈ [0, r), then r ∈ Zβ;
if r ∈ [r, r], then r ∈ Sβ and if r ∈ (r, 1], then r ∈ Iβ. In any equilibrium with
an active search market, there are critical unit costs s and s, such that the set of
sellers can be partitioned into three subsets. If s ∈ [0, s), then s ∈ Iσ; if s ∈ [s, s],
then s ∈ Sσ and if s ∈ (s, 1], then s ∈ Zσ.
The Proposition is proved with the help of the following three Lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Gehrig (1993), Lemma 1) For any positive ask bid spread a−b >
0, some traders will be active in the search market.
Proof : Buyers with r < a and sellers with s > b can expect positive utility
gains from search market participation.¥
Lemma 2 (Gehrig (1993), Lemma 2) In equilibrium, the sets of inactive buy-
ers and sellers, Zβ and Zσ, are closed and convex sets such that 0 ∈ Zβ and
1 ∈ Zσ.
Proof : Let buyer r be inactive and suppose r̃ < r is active. Then r could
imitate r̃ and get at least his payoff, whereas his payoff when inactive is zero.
Completely symmetric reasoning applies for sellers. Finally, buyer 0 and seller 1
remain inactive because they never expect a positive gain from trade.¥
Lemma 3 (Modification of Lemma 3, Gehrig (1993)) In any equilibrium
with an active search market (i.e. Sσ 6= ∅, Sβ 6= ∅),
(i) r0 ∈ Sβ ⇒ r /∈ Iβ for r < r0 and
(ii) s0 ∈ Sσ ⇒ s /∈ Iσ for s > s0.
Proof : Parts of the proof very closely mimic the one by Gehrig (1993) and
Loertscher (2003). We denote by γi, i = σ, β a seller’s and a buyer’s probability
of being successfully matched in the search market with probability λ. Thus, for
6We have added this phrase because there is also an equilibrium where no one joins the
search market. If no one goes to the search market, unilateral deviation to join the search
market does obviously not pay. However, as long as there is no fix cost of joining the search
market, in this equilibrium, two continua of agents play weakly dominated strategies.
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example a seller is matched with probability λγσ = λ min[
υ(Sβ)
υ(Sσ)
, 1]. Since each
agent has measure zero, γi for i = σ, β can be taken as given by every individual
agent.
We first consider (ii) of Lemma 3. Because there are n intermediaries ra-
tioning can occur either at the level of the individual intermediary i and/or at
the intermediated market as a whole. At the individual level, rationing occurs
whenever the number (measure) of sellers willing to sell to intermediary i at bid
price bi exceeds i’s capacity constraint qi. Because rationing is assumed to be
efficient, the qi sellers with the lowest cost who want to sell to intermediary i can
do so in this case. At the market level, rationing occurs if and only if the mea-
sure of sellers joining the intermediated market exceeds aggregate capacity, i.e. iff
υ(Iσ) >
∑n
i qi. Since we must not restrict ourselves to the case where all interme-
diaries set the same bid prices, rationing at the individual level may always occur.
Thus, we are left with the cases with and without rationing at the market level.
We first consider the case without. First note that s0 ∈ Sσ ⇔ γσUσ(s0) ≥ bi− s0,
where Uσ(s0) is the expected utility gain of seller s0 of search market participation
for υ(Sβ) = υ(Sσ) and where bi is the bid price s0 would get when joining the in-
termediated market. Note also that due to efficient rationing, s > s0 would get a
bid price bj ≤ bi when joining the intermediated market, implying bi−s0 > bj−s.
Let F (r) be the cumulative distribution function of buyers active in the search













Because s > s0, Uσ(s0) > Uσ(s). Subtracting (5) from (4) we get


















Since s > 0, λ
∫
s0≤r≤s sdF (r) > 0, so that












dF (r) < s− s0,
Uσ(s) > Uσ(s0)− (s− s0).
Multiplying both sides by γσ, 0 < γσ ≤ 1, we get γσUσ(s) > γσUσ(s0)−γσ(s−s0),
so that
γσUσ(s) > γσUσ(s0)− (s− s0).
However, since s0 ∈ Sσ ⇔ γσUσ(s0) ≥ bi − s0,
γσUσ(s) > (bi − s0)− (s− s0) = bi − s ≥ bj − s,
where bj − s is the utility gain for s of joining the intermediated market. Thus,
s > s0 will not join the intermediated market if s0 joins the search market, which
proves part (ii) in the case without rationing (at the market level). For buyers,
the case (i) without rationing at the market level is completely analogous and
will not be treated here.
Now the case with rationing at the market level can be treated fairly easily.
Again, consider (ii) and assume first that s0 would get get bi > s0 at the interme-
diated market. That is, s0 would not get rationed at the intermediated market.
Then s > s0 would get at most bj ≤ bi at the intermediated market and at worst
0, the worst case occurring when s is one of the sellers who get rationed. Since s
gets at most bj−s < bi−s0, exactly the same reasoning applies as above. Finally,
assume that s0 would get rationed when joining the intermediated market. Due
to efficient rationing, s would then get rationed, too, so that their utility gain
from joining the intermediated market is zero. Thus, they will not join it (recall
the assumption made in subsection 2.1 that agents who expect zero gain from
joining the intermediated market will not do so), and we have s /∈ Iσ. Again, the
case for buyers being completely symmetric, it will not be treated here. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: These three Lemmas state that the sets of inactive
buyers and sellers and the sets of buyers and sellers active in the search market
are convex and directed sets. Therefore, only buyers with high reservation prices
and sellers with low costs can potentially gain by trading with the intermediary.
¥
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2.3 Input Supply and Output Demand Functions
For a > b, Lemma 1 implies that all buyers with r ∈ [s, r] and all sellers with s ∈
[s, r] are active in the search market so that Sβ = Sσ = [s, r].
7 Therefore, in any
equilibrium with a > b, γβ = γσ = 1. Moreover, because reservation prices of all
agents are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, we know that for r ∈ Sβ, r ∼
U [s, r] and for s ∈ Sσ, s ∼ U [s, r]. Therefore, dF (r) = 1r−sdr and dG(s) = 1r−sds,
where F (r) and G(s) are the cumulative distribution functions of buyers and
sellers active in the search market. Since all previous actions are assumed to be
observable, s and r will be known when agents decide whether to join the search
market. Therefore, it suffices to condition this decision on s and r, so that a



















allows us to compute explicitly the expected utility gains from search market
participation and to characterize completely agents’ equilibrium strategies in the
game. This is what we do next.
We begin by briefly describing the equilibrium of the bargaining subgame.
With even sharing, a buyer r and a seller s who are matched in the search
market share the gains from trade r−s equally, provided r−s > 0. We will refer
to seller s and buyer r as the critical seller and buyer. The expected utility gain
for seller s with s ∈ [s, r] from search market participation is then


























r − s ,
which is the same as that derived by Gehrig under the alternative bargaining




(r − s) . (6)
7More precisely, because only agents who can expect positive utility gain from search market
participation are assumed to enter the search market, sellers (buyers) with s = r (r = s) will
not participate in the search market, and we should write Sβ = (s, r] and Sσ = [s, r) or
Sβ = [s+, r] and Sσ = [s, r−], where superscript ”+” (”-”) means marginally ”greater (smaller)
than”. Nonetheless, the search market would be balanced because υ(Sβ) = υ(Sσ), implying
γσ = γβ = 1.
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Likewise, for a buyer with reservation price r ∈ [s, r] the expected utility gain
from being active in the search market is

















r − s ,




(r − s) = Uσ (s) . (7)
Now, the utilities of critical buyers and sellers participating in the search market
in equation (7) can be used to derive the reservation prices of these agents for
joining the intermediated market.8 If buyer r has to pay the ask price A to get
the good from an intermediary with certainty, he is indifferent between joining
the intermediated market and the search market if and only if
r − A = λ
4
(r − s). (8)
Likewise, if seller s is paid the bid price B with certainty when joining the in-
termediated market, he is indifferent between joining the intermediated and the
search market if and only if
B − s = λ
4
(r − s). (9)
Solving equations (8) and (9) yields













Thus, A (r, s) and B (s, r) are reservation prices of buyer r and seller s for joining
the intermediated market, given all s < s and all r > r have joined the intermedi-
ated market and provided there is no rationing (at the market level). In general,
the ask (or bid) prices set by the intermediaries will not be the same. Therefore,
the reservation prices in (10) are to be interpreted as follows. Due to Proposition
1, all agents (including buyer r) know that if r joins the intermediated market,
all r > r will join the intermediated market, too. Thus, if quantities bought and
8Throughout, we assume that all agents - buyers, sellers and intermediaries - are risk neutral.
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ask prices are such that r can buy the good at the ask price ai = A and if all
buyers with higher reservation prices join the intermediated market, too,9 buyer
r would be indifferent between joining the intermediated market and entering the
search market. An analogous interpretation applies for the reservation price B.
Throughout we use upper case letters A and B to denote the (inverse) demand
and supply functions, and lower case letters ai and bi to denote the prices set by an
individual intermediary i. Similarly, we denote aggregate quantities or aggregate
capacities by upper case letters. For example, Q ≡ ∑ni=1 qi denotes aggregate
capacity and Qb ≡ ∑ni=1 qbi is aggregate quantity bought. Note that Qb is the
quantity bought by intermediaries. We make also use of the notational convention
that subscript i denote the variable of intermediary i and subscript −i denote
the variable for all intermediaries other than i. Thus e.g. qi is intermediary i’s
capacity and q−i of all intermediaries other than i, so that by definition Q ≡
qi + q−i.
For there to be no rationing on the input market aggregate capacity Q has
to be at least as great as s. On the other hand, the quantity intermediaries sell
on the output market cannot exceed the quantity bought on the input market,
Qb. Clearly, we thus have Qb = min[s, Q], so that without rationing on either
market r ≥ 1−Qb. Because there are 1− r buyers whose reservation prices are
greater than or equal to r quantity demanded if all intermediaries set a = A (r, s)
is therefore 1 − r. Let Qd ≡ 1 − r denote this quantity and note that this is
quantity demanded at the intermediaries. For the same reasons as for buyers,
there are s sellers who are willing to sell at bid price b (r, s), provided the buyer
with the highest reservation price in the search market is buyer r. Therefore, s
is equal to the quantity the intermediaries can buy at the bid price b (r, s) (if
capacities allow them to do so), which is Qb. If we replace r by 1−Qd and s by





























9This is the case if ai = maxj [aj ], j = 1, ..., n and if aggregate capacity is equal to or greater
than 1−r, which is the quantity demanded at the intermediated market when r is the indifferent
buyer.
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4− λ− 4a + λQb . (15)
Finally, note also that these functions are valid only under the provision that there
is an active search market from which some agents can expect positive utility
gains. This requires that r > s. If r ≤ s, agents lose the outside option of search
market participation. In this case, seller s would join the intermediated market
whenever b > s and a buyer r will buy from the intermediaries whenever a < r.





with the (inverse) Walrasian demand function 1−Qd,
the willingness to pay for intermediated trade is given by the (inverse) Walrasian
demand function. Therefore, the reservation prices of buyers for intermediated







, 1−Qd] . (16)




with 1−Qd is at the point
where 1−Qd = Qb. Analogously, the (inverse) input supply function B (Qd, Qb)
in equation (12) is valid only to the left of the intersection with Qb. Beyond that
point, expected utility gain from search market participation in not positive,
and the reservation prices for trading through the intermediary are given by the
(inverse) Walrasian supply function. Hence, the sellers’ reservation prices the










Again, the point of intersection is where 1 − Qd = Qb. Finally, when quantity
bought equals quantity sold, i.e. Qd = Qb = Q, we say that trade in the interme-
















Below it will be useful to have an expression for the input supply function under
balanced trade. This function is
S (b) =
4b− λ
2 (2− λ) , (20)
so that under balanced trade the inverse output demand function can be written





= 1− b. (21)
Figure ?? depicts the Walrasian demand and supply functions and the search
constrained output demand and input supply functions for the intermediaries,
under the assumption that intermediated trade is balanced.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ROUND HERE]
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the dynamic intermediation game with capacity
constraints has a subgame perfect equilibrium which replicates the Cournot out-
come if firms are given Cournot capacities. We proceed as follows. In section 3.1,
we briefly review the basic concepts of Cournot competition and translate their
meaning so that they fit to our model. Then in section 3.2, we analyze the output
market subgame for any aggregate quantities bought Qb ≤ 1
2
= QW , the quantity
traded under Walrasian conditions. In the unique equilibrium of this subgame,
all firms set the market clearing ask price. In section 3.3 we show that the input
market subgame has a unique equilibrium if all firms i = 1, .., n have capacities
qi smaller than or equal to the capacities given by the Cournot reaction function.
In this equilibrium, all firms set a market clearing bid price. In the Appendix,
we show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium if one firm has a larger ca-
pacity than given by the Cournot reaction function. A proof for the existence
of an equilibrium in the mixed strategy region as well as further considerations
concerning Cournot competition are also relegated to the Appendix.
3.1 Preliminary: The Cournot Outcome
Since Cournot competition typically refers to competition on a product market
organized by a Walrasian auctioneer we have to make clear what we mean by
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Cournot competition and Cournot outcome in the present setting. When speak-
ing of Cournot competition we henceforth mean that the intermediation industry
is organized as a Cournot market. Both on the input and on the output market
of intermediation a (Walrasian) auctioneer quotes market clearing ask and bid
prices, given the quantities intermediaries want to buy and sell and given the
inverse supply and demand functions, constrained by the agent’ outside option
of search market participation. Under Cournot conditions, every intermediary
quotes the quantity he wants to trade, and the auctioneer then sets market clear-
ing prices. As a Cournot competitor, each intermediary i thus maximizes his
profits by choosing his optimal quantity q∗i , given the quantities of all other in-
termediaries, q−i and given the (inverse) supply and demand functions B(Q)
and A(Q). Let πi(qi, q−i) denote firm i’s profits when setting quantity qi. The
maximization problem for i thus is
max
qi
πi(qi, q−i) = (A(Q)−B(Q)) qi
= (A(qi + q−i)−B(qi + q−i)) qi, (22)
which yields the following first order condition
0 = (A′(q∗i + q−i)−B′(q∗i + q−i)) q∗i + A(q∗i + q−i)−B(q∗i + q−i). (23)
The solution q∗i is called i’s best response or reaction function and denoted as
r(q−i). It is implicitly defined as
r(q−i) =
A(r(q−i) + q−i)−B(r(q−i) + q−i)
− (A′(r(q−i) + q−i)−B′(r(q−i) + q−i)) . (24)
Because A(Q) has a negative slope and is (weakly) concave and B(Q) is positive
sloped and (weakly) convex the maximization problem (22) is a concave problem
so that the solution in (24) is the unique (interior) maximum. The corner solution
with r(q−i) = 0 arises only if q−i is so large that A(q−i)−B(q−i) ≤ 0.
At this point it is convenient to define the spread function Z(Q) ≡ A(Q) −
B(Q). Note that because of the properties of A(Q) and B(Q) just mentioned,
Z(Q) is negatively sloped and weakly concave. If we differentiate (23) with





−Z ′′ − Z ′
rZ ′′ + 2Z ′
, (25)
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where we have dropped arguments of r(.) and Z(.). The property r′ < 0 is readily
established for any concave function Z. To see this, note that −Z ′′−Z ′ > 0 and
rZ ′′ + Z ′ < 0. Moreover, if Z is a linear function, we have Z ′′ = 0, implying that
r′ > −1 and d(r(q−i)+q−i)
dq−i
> 0.
In our setting, Z(Q) = 2−λ
2
− (2−λ)Q, so that r(q−i) = 12 − q−i− r(q−i). This







An equilibrium under Cournot competition is reached if and only if all interme-
diaries i = 1, .., n trade a quantity equal to their best responses, i.e. if
qi = r(q−i)∀i. (27)
By symmetry, we have qi = qj = q in any equilibrium. Therefore, q−i = (n−1)qi =
(n− 1)q, so that (27) can be written as
q = r((n− 1)q)∀i. (28)
Because the left-hand side begins at zero and is increasing in q while the right-
hand side begins at r(0) > 0 and decreases in q, there is a unique q such that this
equality is satisfied. Denote by qC the value of q such that equality (28) holds.
Plugging this into (26) and solving yields qC = 1
2(n+1)
























Note that as n gets arbitrarily large, QC
−→= 1
2







−→ ( +→)” means ”approaches from below (above)”. Or put
in words: As the number of competing intermediaries gets large, the outcome of
Cournot competition converges to the Walrasian market outcome. Finally, note
also that for n = 1, QC = 1
4








, which is the equilibrium
analyzed by Gehrig (1993).
3.2 The Output Market Subgame
We first prove a Lemma that says that in equilibrium, the quantity traded by
intermediaries cannot exceed the Walrasian quantity. This seems very intuitive.
The proof, though, is not straightforward. The following Lemma is useful because




Lemma 4 There is no equilibrium in which aggregate quantity bought Qb exceeds
the Walrasian quantity QW = 1
2
.
Proof : Consider a monopolistic intermediary. He would sell his quantity
bought Qb at the ask price am, which is defined as the ask price for which the
(ask) price elasticity of output demand, ε(a,Qb), is minus one if his quantity
bought allows him to sell that much (i.e. if Qb is large enough). Otherwise, he
would set the market clearing price for Qb, which is above am. Setting ε(a,Qb)







which is smaller than 1
2
for Qb < 1 and λ > 0. But in order to be able to sell
all that is demanded at am, Qb has to be larger than 1
2
. As observed above, for
1 − Qd < Qb, the relevant inverse demand function is A = 1 − Qd because the
search market shuts down. The elasticity of A = 1 − Qd is -1 at a = 1
2
. Thus,
for Qb > 1
2
, the monopolistic intermediary would set am = 1
2
, and the search
market shuts down for Qb > 1
2
. Therefore, the relevant inverse supply function
is B = Qb in this range. Because under efficient rationing aggregate quantity
bought is equal to the aggregate supply S(.) at the lowest bid price for which
Qb(.) > 0, all firms must therefore pay a bid price greater than 1
2
in order to
buy Qb > 1
2
.10 But the aggregate revenue of competing intermediaries whose
aggregate quantity bought exceeds 1
2
will not be larger than the revenue of a







), while the expenditure needed to acquire Qb is at least
Qb × Qb > 1
4
. Therefore Qb > 1
2
implies that the intermediation industry makes
negative profits. Because each intermediary has the outside option of making
zero profits (e.g. by quoting b = 0), this cannot be an equilibrium. ¥
Now let us turn to the question what the equilibrium of the ask price setting
subgame is, given Qb ≤ 1
2
. But because Qd ≤ Qb, for Qb the relevant inverse
demand function, i.e. min[A(Qd, Qb), 1 − Qd] as defined in (11), is A(Qd, Qb).
We first show that ask prices ai < A(Q) (where A(Q) is as defined in (18)) will
not be set in equilibrium. The reason for this is that these prices are strictly
10This is true only under the condition that no intermediary sets a bid price greater than
the one at which aggregate capacity clears, but in equilibrium this condition is satisfied (see
section 3.3).
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dominated: At the price ai firm i sells q
b
i , no matter what ask prices the other
firms set, whereas by setting a∗ = A(Q) intermediary i would earn a∗qbi > aiq
b
i
regardless of the prices the other firms set. Thus, ask prices ai < A(Q) can be
ruled out.
What we have not yet shown is whether higher prices than a∗ can occur in
equilibrium. That is, whether in equilibrium intermediated trade can be unbal-
anced with Qd < Qb. We now show that this is not the case. To see that,
suppose that all firms other than i set a−i = A(Q) and consider what the best
response of i is. As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 4, the ask price elasticity
of output demand is smaller than minus one for Qb ≤ 1
2
. Therefore increasing
the ask price by one percent will result in a decrease of quantity demanded by
more than one percent. Therefore, increasing ai will not pay for i. Note that
this is the case regardless of whether a proportional or an efficient rationing rule
applies.11 It is also quite intuitive to see that this equilibrium is unique. Sup-
pose that one firm j sets the ask price aj > a
∗, where a∗ is clearing price, i.e.
a∗ = A(Q). Then, if Qd(a−j ) ≷ qb−j, the remaining firms’ best response will be




. In either case, aj is not optimal for j. In the
former case, j sells nothing, in the latter, he could discontinuously increase his
profits by underbidding the competitors’ price a−j because he would sell (discon-
tinuously) more while the loss due to the lower price is small. Thus, there is no
other equilibrium (see also Vives, 1999, ch.5).
The fact that in the unique equilibrium of the output market subgame each
intermediary sets the market clearing price a∗ is very useful for us because it
allows us to treat the output market subgame as a parameterized function that
depends only on the (aggregate) quantity bought Qb.
3.3 The Input Market Subgame
We now turn to the analysis of the bid price setting (or input market) subgame.
We show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the bid price setting subgame
if all intermediaries have capacities no greater than the Cournot capacities. In
this equilibrium all intermediaries i play the pure strategy bi = b
∗ ≡ B(Q).
11For a brief description and discussion of these rules see e.g. Vives (1999) or the appendix
in Loertscher (2003).
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3.3.1 Pure Strategy Equilibrium for Cournot capacities
Given the (observed) capacity constraints for all i = 1, .., n firms, on the input
market each firm sets a bid price bi with the aim of maximizing his profits.
Recall that on the output market no firm will ever set a price below the one at
which market clears (see Subsection 3.2). Very similarly, in the bid price setting
subgame, no firm will ever want to set a bid price b > B(Q). An obvious (and in
fact the only)12 candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium is the market clearing
bid price b∗ = B(Q). To see whether bi = B(Q) ≡ b∗ for all i is indeed an
equilibrium, suppose that all firms other than j set b−j = B(Q), and consider
whether (or when) deviation from b∗ pays for j. Bid prices above B(Q) being
strictly dominated, we only have to consider ”downward” deviation. As j sets
bj < b
∗, he faces a residual supply of max[S(bj) − q−j, 0], which will be his
quantity bought qbj . Note that for q
b
i > 0, aggregate quantity bought will just
be S(bj). This is convenient, because the ask price resulting from behavior on
the input market will affect the outcome on the output market. Since the unique
equilibrium of the ask price setting game is to set ai = A(Q
b), the equilibrium
price on the output market is a direct function of bj. If we assume that all other
agents do not change their behavior, i.e stick to bi = b
∗, it is a function only
of j’s bid price. If bj is such that q
b
j > 0, then A(Q
b) = A(S(bj)), while for
qbj = S(bj)− q−j = 0, A(Qb) = A(q−j). But the latter case will not matter much
to j, since with qbj = 0, his profits are zero independently of A(.). Therefore,
assuming bj is such that q
b
j > 0, j’s profits when deviating from b
∗ are given by
the following equation:





Maximizing with respect to bj yields




+ (A(S(bj))− bj) S ′(bj). (31)








+ A(S(bj))− bj. (32)
12Vives (1999, p.129) shows this for the case of capacity constrained price setting under a
concave demand function.
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Define by x(q−j) the optimal quantity j buys when all other firms set b
∗ and have
capacities q−j. Obviously, x(q−j) = S(bj)− q−j as given in equation (32). Noting
that with x(q−j) thus defined, bj = B(x(q−j) + q−j), S
′(bj) = 1B′(x(q−j)+q−j) and
making the appropriate substitutions, we can write (32) as
0 =
[
A′(x(q−j) + q−j)−B′(x(q−j) + q−j)
]
x(q−j)
+A(x(q−j) + q−j)−B(x(q−j) + q−j). (33)
As noted above, the spread, defined as Z(y) ≡ A(y) − B(y), is a decreasing,
(weakly) concave function in y. Therefore we can rewrite the above equation to
get
0 = Z ′(x(q−j) + q−j)x(q−j) + Z(x(q−j) + q−j), (34)
from where it becomes clear that x(q−j) is j’s Cournot best response function
(with no production cost), i.e. x(q−j) ≡ r(q−j) because x(.) in (34) is defined
by exactly the same condition as r(q−j) in equation (24) above. That is, x(q−j)
is the best response function if both the input and the output market were or-
ganized in Cournot-Walras manner. Put differently, if intermediaries brought
binding pledges how much they are willing to buy (and subsequently to sell)
to the Walrasian auctioneer and the auctioneer then set market clearing prices,
intermediaries’ best responses were given by the function x(.) defined above.
Therefore, from now on we write r(.) for the Cournot reaction function with zero
production cost on the spread Z(.).
Let us now come back and finally answer the question under what conditions it
pays firm j to underbid if all other firms set b∗. Then, whenever B(r(q−j)+q−j) ≥
b∗ = B(Q), j’s best response is to set bj = b∗ since bid prices above b∗ are strictly
dominated: If firm j could, it would buy r(qj), but because this is more than qj,
it cannot buy that much. Therefore, it does not pay for j to set a price higher
than b∗. Clearly, we therefore have an equilibrium where all firms set b∗ if for all
firms i, qi ≤ r(q−i).13 The argument needed to establish uniqueness is analogous
to the one of the output market subgame. Bid prices above b∗ = B(Q) being
strictly dominated, the only alternative candidates for an equilibrium are bid
prices smaller than b∗. However, whenever a firm i sets a bid price bi < b∗, at
13This condition is exactly the same that has to hold in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) for
there to be pure strategy equilibrium in region I.
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least one other firm, say, j will optimally set a price above bi (but below b
∗) so
that firm i’s profits would discontinuously increase by setting a slightly higher
price than j does. Thus, there is no other equilibrium.
Let qC ≡ qC denote the Cournot capacity as defined in (28). Then we can
neatly summarize our findings as follows:
Proposition 2 For capacities qi ≤ qC for all i = 1, .., n, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in the input market subgame, in which all intermediaries set the mar-
ket clearing bid price b∗ = B(Q).
Proof : The proof follows directly from the above analysis.¥
Equilibrium for the full game A question of great interest is of course
whether setting Cournot capacities is an equilibrium (or more precisely, part
of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile) for the full game. In order to
show this we must investigate whether firm i has an incentive to deviate from
setting the capacity constraint qC if all −i set q−i = qC . It is clear from the
results of Cournot competition that deviation to qi < q
C will not pay. Why?
Recall from the two previous subsections that in this case, equilibrium prices
both on the input and on the output market will be market clearing. Since this
is the situation prevailing under Cournot competition, the deviation qi < q
C will
not be profitable. Thus the only candidate deviation we have to consider entail
qi > q
C . In this case, the equilibrium in the bid price setting subgame involves
(non-degenerate) mixed strategies. However, as it turns out it is very hard to
characterize the equilibrium revenue (and more so to characterize the equilibrium
strategies) for a deviating firm, and thus far we have not been able to pin down
this revenue (see also Appendix A).
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced capacity constrained competition between
market-making and price setting intermediaries. Capacity constraints prevent
competition between price setters to degenerate into Bertrand-style perfect com-
petition. We have shown that intermediaries endowed with Cournot capacities
(or with smaller than Cournot capacities) set market clearing bid and ask prices
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on the input and output market. Therefore, given Cournot capacities, firms set
the same prices and trade the same quantities on the subgame perfect equilibrium
path of our game as would be set and traded if input and output market were
organized by a Walrasian auctioneer. A corollary of this is that the equilibrium
outcome of our model coincides with the Walrasian perfect competition outcome
when the number of intermediaries with Cournot capacities becomes large.
The fact that the search market only shuts down completely if the number of
intermediaries approaches infinity and if there is no cost associated with inter-
mediating may seem somewhat odd. Assuming that these two conditions hold is
certainly not less demanding than the the assumptions underlying the Walrasian
model. However, this problem can be easily mended by introducing a fix cost to
search market participation. Then, the search market shuts down for a quantity
traded smaller than the Walrasian one, and firms can make positive profits (or
at least set positive ask-bid spreads) in the absence of an active search market.
The paper can also be seen as an attempt to analyze competition between
exchange mechanism that differ with respect to their efficiency. In a next step,
we consider introducing a minimal size for the search market to be operational.
[To be completed]
Appendix
A Region of Mixed Strategy Equilibria
We first show that for capacities qi > q
C and q−i = q
C , there is no equilibrium in
pure strategies. The reason is as follows. Recall from subsection 3.3 that given
b−i = b∗ = B(Q), intermediary i’s best response is to set bi = B(r(q−i) + q−i) <
B(Q). Note that B(r(q−i)+q−i) > B(q−i) because for q−i = (n−1)qC , r(q−i) > 0
and denote the bid price B(r(q−i) + q−i) as b. Now, given that i sets b, setting
b−i = b∗ is not a best response for the other firms since each of them can buy
the same quantity qb = qC by setting a lower price. Because b > B(q−i), the
lowest bid price at which this is possible is b+ for bi = b. But with b−i = b
+,
i’s profits increase if he sets a bid price slightly larger than b+ since by doing
so he can buy a discontinuously larger quantity while the loss due to the higher
price is negligible. Because this type of reasoning applies for any constellation of
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This raises the question whether there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Since there are no equilibria in pure strategies and because strategies are contin-
uous while firms’ payoffs are discontinuous, it is not a priori clear that the game
has an equilibrium.14 Speaking somewhat loosely, we may say that Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) (DM hereafter) show that sufficient conditions for the existence of
a mixed strategy equilibrium in discontinuous games are that
1. discontinuities arise only at particular strategy combinations (e.g. in the
Bertrand model when both firms set the same price)
2. the sum of payoff functions is upper semi-continuous (which is the case e.g.
in the Bertrand model, where in the absence of production costs aggregate
profits are piD(pi) no matter what price firm j sets, provided only pj ≥ pi)
3. individual payoff function are bounded and weakly lower semi-continuous
(as defined by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, p.7)
It can be shown that these conditions hold in the present model. However,
since we wish to compute expected profits in the region with mixed strategy
equilibria, it will not do to know that an equilibrium exists. Rather, we would
have to determine the equilibrium strategies, or more precisely, the expected
equilibrium revenues in this region (which is in principle possible without an
explicit characterization of the equilibrium strategies).
A.1 Existence of an Equilibrium
In order to show that the game we consider has an equilibrium, we must show
that the conditions of Theorem 5 of DM are satisfied.
14Nash (1950, 1951)’s proof guaranteed the existence of a (mixed strategy) equilibrium for
finite games, that is for games with a finite number of strategies for each player and finite
number of players. Debreu (1952), Fan (1952) and Glicksberg (1952) then proved the existence
of an equilibrium for a wider class of games, and some authors, notably the above-mentioned
Levitan and Shubik (1972), proved the existence of an equilibrium for particular games. See
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for more details. However, general
and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in discontinuous games had to await
the seminal contribution by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
A REGION OF MIXED STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA 27
We prove existence only for n = 2 firms. The proof for any n goes along the
same line, but necessitates a some additional notation.
Recall that a pure strategy of player i is choice of bi ∈ [0,∞), so that for n = 2,
the strategy space is [0,∞)× [0,∞) ⊂ R2. Translated to our setting, Theorem 5
of DM states that sufficient conditions for our game to have an equilibrium are




i πi(b1, b2) is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) and πi(b1, b2) is bounded and
weakly lower semi-continuous (w.l.s.c.).
Condition (1) is easily seen to hold. Consider profits of firm 1. Then, for b1 <
min[B(q2), b2], π1(b1, b2) = 0, which is continuous. For b1 ∈ [B(q2), b2),π1(b1, b2) =
(A(b1)−b1)(S(b1)−q2), which is continuous because both A(b1)−b1 and S(b1)−q2
are continuous functions. Finally, for b1 > b2, profits of firm 1 are π1(b1, b2) =(
A(min[b2, B(Q)]− b1)
)
min[q1, S(b1)], which is a continuous function in b1.
It takes a bit more to establish that condition (2) is met. However, a sufficient
condition for upper semi-continuity of the sum of profits is that the sum of profits
is continuous, which is quite easily seen. Since discontinuities of individual profits
occur only if both firms set the same bid price, we have to investigate the sum of
profits only at points where b1 = b2 = b.
For simplicity, consider first the case, where b and capacities are such that
mini[qi] ≥ S(b)2 and that maxi[qi] < S(b). Then, for b1 = b, profits of 1 and 2 are
(A(b)− b)S(b)
2
, so that the sum of profits is (A(b)− b)S(b). Now assume that firm
1 sets b1 > b2. Then π1(b1, b) = (A(b)−b1)q1 and π2(b1, b) = (A(b)−b)(S(b)−q1),
so that the sum of profits is (A(b)− b)S(b)− (b1 − b)q1. As b1 approaches b, this
is (A(b)− b)S(b), which is continuous.
Let us now turn to the other cases, where b and qi are not such that mini[qi] ≥
S(b)
2
and/or max[qi] < S(b).
15 Assume without loss of generality that q1 ≥ q2. If
min[q1, 2q2] > S(b), then
∑
i πi(b, b) = (A(b) − b)S(b) as above. But q1 > S(b)
implies π2(b1, b) = 0 for b1 only slightly larger than b, so that
∑
i πi(b1, b) =
π1(b1, b) = (A(b1) − b1)S(b1). Again, therefore, limb1→b
∑
i πi(b1, b) = (A(b) −
b)S(b) =
∑




are two possibilities in this case. Either (a) Q ≤ S(b) or (b) Q > S(b). If (a) is
15But for this to be a mixed strategy equilibrium, min[qi] < QW must still hold, of course.
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the case, then quantity bought will be Q at b and b1. Thus, inverse demand will
be A(B(Q)) regardless of whether 1 sets b or b1, and aggregate profits will be
(A(B(Q))− b)Q if both firms set b. For b1 > b, aggregate profits are (A(B(Q))−
b1)q1 + (A(B(Q)) − b)q2, so that, again, limb1→b
∑
i πi(b1, b) =
∑
i πi(b, b). In
case (b),
∑
i πi(b, b) = (A(b)− b)S(b) and
∑
i πi(b1, b) = (A(b)− b1)q1 + (A(b)−
b)(S(b)− q1), implying as before limb1→b
∑
i πi(b1, b) =
∑
i πi(b, b).
To see that πi(b1, b2) is bounded, let b̂ denote the highest admissible price.
Then π1(b1, b2) ≥ (A(B(Q)) − b̂)q1 and π1(b1, b2) ≤ (A(B(r(0)))− B(r(0)))r(0).
Similarly, π2(b1, b2) ≥ (A(B(Q))−b̂)q2 and π2(b1, b2) ≤ (A(B(r(0)))−B(r(0)))r(0).
Thus, πi(.)is bounded for i = 1, 2. Finally, we turn to weakly lower semi-
continuity. In order to do so, we first apply Definition 6 of DM to our problem.
Definition 1 (DM Definition 6) π1(.) is called weakly lower semi-continuous
















2) ≥ π1(b′1, b′2) 16
For π2(.), w.l.s.c. is defined in complete analogy.
To see that both functions satisfy w.l.s.c., note that whenever πi(.) is dis-
continuous, i’s profits strictly increase by either underbidding or overbidding the
other player’s bid price. Accordingly, let λ be one in the former and zero in the
latter case, and w.l.s.c. is established.
Therefore, Theorem 5 of DM applies, from which we conclude that our game
has a (mixed strategy) equilibrium.
A.2 Expected revenue in the mixed strategy equilibrium
Recall (once more) from above that i’s best response when the other firms sets
b−i = B(Q) is to set b ≡ B(r(q−i) + q−i). Interestingly, setting bj = B(r(q−j) +
q−j) is the optimal bid price for any intermediary j who is certain that he sets the
lowest bid price, j = 1, ..., n. That is, if b−j > bj for all −j, then j’s best response
is to set B(r(q−j) + q−j). To see this, note that when j sets the lowest bid price,
aggregate quantity bought will be S(bj).
17 Because everything that is bought on
16As above, −→ ( +→) means that b1 approaches b′1 from the left (right).
17This is of course true only under the condition that bj is such j can buy something.
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the input market will subsequently be sold on the output market at the market
clearing ask price (see section 3.2) the equilibrium ask price intermediary j (and
any other intermediary) will get is a function of S(bj) and thus a function of bj
only. Therefore, j’s expected profits in this case are









= qbj . From section 3.3 we know that the solution to this
maximization problem is to choose bj such that q
b
j = r(q−j), implying that the
optimal bid price bj is equal to B(r(q−j) + q−j). Let us denote this price by bj.
Because in a mixed strategy equilibrium, agents are indifferent between the pure
strategies over which they randomize this firm’s expected equilibrium revenue is
the revenue accruing when setting this bid price, which is the Stackelberg follower
revenue.
The main problem for determining the expected equilibrium revenue of the
deviating firm is that it is not easily possible to say whih firm sets bj. The
reason for this that it is hard to determine the upper bound of prices over which
firms randomize in the mixed strategy equilibrium. This is in contrast to the
procedure applied by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Deneckere and Kovenock
(1996), where both bounds of the support are quite ”easy” to identify and where
these bounds are used to determine which firm(s) get(s) the Stackelberg follower
revenue.
B The Cournot Model
What we call the Cournot model (or Cournot auctioneer model)18 is the following.
There are n ≥ 1 producers of a homogenous good who seek to maximize their
own profits. They know each others’ cost function and the downward sloping
demand function P (.).19 These n firms produce simultaneously before bringing
their produce to the common market place, where they give it into the hands
of a benevolent agent, the so called (Walrasian) auctioneer. The task of this
auctioneer consists of organizing the market, that is, he collects the quantities
18Of course, the label ”Cournot auctioneer” model is ahistorical since the auctioneer due to
Walras. Nonetheless, we use this label because we think it is an accurate description.
19For technical reasons, and depending on the firms’ cost functions, a negative slope is not a
sufficient condition, so the function is also often required not to be too convex.
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produced by all the n firms and then sets the price at which the market clears.
After the market has cleared, it is shut down and further trade is made impossible.
This last assumption is often not made explicitly, but it is a necessary one because
in Cournot equilibrium with a finite number of firms, the market clears at a price
above marginal costs. Since there remain buyers willing to pay a price above
marginal costs after market clearing has taken place, firms have incentives to
serve these buyers and to increase their profits.
At least some of the assumptions underlying the Cournot auctioneer model
are overtly fictitious and have been heavily criticized. Most prominent is the
classical criticism by Bertrand (1883) who pointed out that as a matter of fact,
firms actually do set prices and not merely quantities. Nonetheless, the Cournot
model is intellectually appealing, though not because of its assumptions but for
the predictions it makes. This appeal is neatly formulated in the following quote,
taken from Mas-Collel et al. (1995, p.394):
...[M]any economists have thought that the Cournot model gives the
right answer for the wrong reasons.
In our judgement, what makes it particularly valuable is that it contains the
whole range of market outcomes. Basically, as the number of firms is one, the
market price (and profits) are high. When this number increases, price and
profits fall, until in the limit profits are zero and the market outcome is that of
perfect competition. The appeal of the Cournot model is not least witnessed in
the large and still growing literature (spanning now over more than a century),
which makes an effort to find the right reasons for the right predictions, if we want
to paraphrase Mas-Collel et al. (1995). Undoubtedly, the most spectacular and
influential contribution into this direction has been made by KS, with which we
deal extensively below.20 After this brief introduction to the Cournot (auctioneer)
model, we discuss next the basic concepts of this model.
B.1 The reaction function
The most important concept is the (Cournot) reaction or best response function.
20A more detailed and accurate description would at this point also refer to the classical
treatment of the problem by Edgeworth (1897) and to Levitan and Shubik (1972). Dealing
with a simple example with linear demand, the latter authors derived the pure and the mixed
strategy equilibria when firms set prices, given capacity constraints.
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There are n ≥ 1 firms indexed as i = 1, .., n. We denote by qi the quantity
produced by firm i and by Q =
∑n
j qj the aggregate quantity produced. Finally,
let q−i denote the aggregate quantity produced by all firms other than i, i.e.
q−i = Q− qi. Note that Q = qi + q−i by definition and that dq−i/dqi = −1.
Under Cournot competition, profits of firm i when the other firm sells quantity
qj and when i’s cost of production are zero are qiP (Q) = qiP (qi + q−i). The (zero
production cost) reaction function r(q) when all other firms produce q is defined
r(q) ∈ arg max rP (r + q),
implying
0 = rP ′(r + q) + P (r + q), (36)
so that r(q) is implicitly given by
r(q) =
P (r(q) + q)
−P ′(r(q) + q) . (37)
Note that because D(p) and P (Q) are (weakly) concave, the second derivative
of rP (r + q) with respect to r is always negative (i.e. the function r(Pr + q) is
concave, too). Therefore, the set of arg max rP (r + q) contains a single element,
and thus the solution r(q) in equation (38) is unique.
It turns out to be very useful to know two properties about the slope of r(q).
Therefore, let us differentiate equation (36) with respect to q, set this equal to
zero and solve for r′(q) to get21
r′ =
−rP ′′ − P ′
rP ′′ + 2P ′
, (38)
where for notational simplicity and because it does not give way to confusion, we
have dropped the arguments.
First, we note that r′ < 0, which follows from the fact that P (.) is (weakly)
concave, and therefore the denominator is negative and the nominator positive.
Second, r′ > −1. To see this, multiply −rP ′′−P ′
rP ′′+2P ′ > −1 by the denominator and
cancel terms to get 1 < 2 (keep in mind that the denominator is negative, so
that the sign changes after the multiplication). The fact that r′ > −1 implies
that r(q) + q strictly increases in q, which is a result that will repeatedly be used
below.
21The idea behind this is that equation (36) holds for any q. Therefore, as q changes, r(q)
must change in such a way that equality (36) still holds.
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It is also useful to have an expression for the revenue of firm i with zero
production costs as a function of the quantity of all firms other than i when i
uses its best response r(q−i). This revenue is R(q−i) := r(q−i)P (r(q−i) + q−i).
Note that this is firm i’s maximal revenue as a function of the quantity set
by all other firms. If for example n = 2, then firm 1’s maximal revenue is
R(q−1) := r(q−1)P (r(q−1) + q−1) = r(q2)P (r(q2) + q2).
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium An equilibrium is thus defined as a quantity q∗
such that r(q∗)− q∗ = 0.
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Figure 1:  
The search market constrained supply and demand functions. Note 
that trade is assumed to be balanced. 
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Figure 2: Region of pure strategy Nash equilibria for n=2. 
